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IMPARTIAL PUBLIC REVIEW OF INTERNAL UNION
DISPUTES: EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SELF-DISCIPLINE
JERo E H. B1ooKs*
On April 8, 1957, President Walter P. Reuther of the Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW), speaking to some 2700 delegates to the
Sixteenth Constitutional Convention of the union, advocated that they
adopt amendments to the UAW constitution which, under proper cir-
cumstances, would empower an outside group to remove Reuther or
any other international union officer from office. The delegates heeded
his request and voted overwhelmingly in favor of creating the inter-
national union's Public Review Board (PRB). 1 It is doubtful that
any other private association of individuals of comparable size and
power has ever voluntarily relinquished power of this magnitude to
another group.
The initial press reaction to the UAW's action making impartial
public review available to its membership was varied: to some it was a
panacea; to others, a palliative or, worse yet, mere window dressing;
most maintained a wait-and-see attitude.'
Especially in the past twenty-five years, American unions have
experienced significant developments both internally and in relation
to society in general. This paper will examine certain of these develop-
ments in respect to the parts they have played in creating the conditions
which have given birth to impartial public review of internal union
disputes. The paper will also examine the structure of the UAW's
Public Review Board and its activities during the three and one-half
years of its existence.3
I
THE CHANGING ROLE OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN
AmERICAN SOCIETY
A. Pre-Wagner Act Conditions
Until the present generation, American unions and their members
experienced a turbulent existence. As exemplified by the Philadelphia
*Executive Director, Public Review Board, UAW (1959-60). Regional Attorney,
NLRB, Detroit Office.
1 Proceedings Sixteenth Constitutional Convention, United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) 108.
2 See, e.g., editorials in Providence, R.I., Labor News, April, 1957; Washington Post,
April 10, 1957, § A, p. 13, col. 2; Cleveland News, April 9, 1957, p. 14, cols. 3-5; Shreve-
port Times, March 27, 1957, § A, p. 6.
3 As discussed in this paper at IV, A, infra, to an extent more limited than the
UAW, two other unions have also adopted impartial public review.
INTERNAL UNION DISPUTES
Cordwainers' case,4 when working men in this country first began to
engage in concerted efforts to improve their employment conditions, the
very existence of an organization which had the purpose of represent-
ing and bargaining on behalf of employees constituted a criminal con-
spiracy. Until 1937, when the Wagner Act5 was declared constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court,6 the external threats to the
existence of unions overshadowed all other of their problems. Prior
to the Wagner Act, many, if not most, employers openly coerced and
restrained their employees from joining labor organizations, often
discharging them on the spot for showing sympathy for the union
cause. Labor historians reveal that it was commonplace for judicial,
legislative, and executive officers at various levels of government to
adopt measures intended to suppress union organizational efforts.7
Collective bargaining agreements containing provisions for a union
shop or other forms of union security whereby membership in a union
is compulsory were comparatively rare until recent years. Prior to the
Wagner Act, any workman who joined a union was fully aware that
exposure of his action might result in his summary discharge and,
as sometimes happened, it might also cause him to be blacklisted from
employment elsewhere in the community or the industry. The work-
men and their unions affected by such drastic employer action rarely,
if ever, had any legal remedy.
Under such circumstances, the act of an ordinary workman, with
a family to feed, in joining a union was truly voluntary and his union's
objective was basic: recognition by the employer of the employee's or-
ganization as the bargaining agent on behalf of the bargaining group.8
4 Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), as reported in 3 Commons & Gilmore, Docu-
mentary History of American Industrial Society, 59-236.
5 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449-457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
6 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
7 See, e.g., Chamberlain, Labor 16-31 (1958); Cummins & DeVyver, The Labor
Problem in the United States 422-52 (3d ed. 1947); Faulkner & Starr, Labor in America
164-84 (1944).
8 It is not to be implied that, prior to the Wagner Act era, every industry, employer,
and government official openly engaged in anti-union activities. But there is little doubt
that the above depicts one of the dominant attitudes of certain segments of the American
society of those times. Nor is it to be implied that employer threats and reprisals against
unions and their members completely disappeared with the advent of the 1935 Wagner
Act, which made it an unfair labor practice for employers engaged in interstate com-
merce to interfere with their employees' organizational and other concerted activities
pertaining to conditions of employment. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959,
there were 8266 charges filed with the NLRB which alleged employer unfair labor
practices. 24 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 163, Table 2 (1959). It should be understood that
many of these charges ultimately were determined to be without merit and others in-
volved unlawful favoritism by employers to particular labor organizations.
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B. Post-Wagner Act Conditions
In the years immediately preceding the enactment of the Wagner
Act, the principle of union representation of workers gained increased
acceptance; since the passage of the act, the increase in union size,
strength, and scope of activity has been truly phenomenal. An abun-
dance of legislation favorable to unions vigorously enforced by a body
of court decisions is on the books. Sympathetic treatment by public
officials has become the rule and not the exception in many localities.
As a result, great changes have been wrought, many of which affect
the relationship of the member to the union vis-h-vis the internal affairs
of the organization. It is submitted that there are four such changes
or developments which are especially germane to our inquiry.
First is the principle of majority representationY The funda-
mental theory of representation as expressed in the Wagner Act and
repeated verbatim in section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended,1" is that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment....
A union which is recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative
has the right to act effectively in relation to the pay, hours, and other
conditions of employment of all employees of the employer involved.
Such a representative need not solicit (or heed) the desires of the
employees it represents, by election or otherwise, concerning strikes it
calls or other action it deems appropriate to take in connection with
conditions of employment.1
9 Some of the debate which went on within the inner circles of the New Deal in
the early days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's regime in respect to this principle is
most interestingly revealed in 2 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal-The Age of
Roosevelt 147, 397-400 (1959).
10 61 Stat. 136-52 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1952). The NLRA, in the form in
which it existed prior to its substantial amendment in 1947, is popularly known as the
Wagner Act; in the form in which it was amended in 1947 and at subsequent dates, it
is often called the Taft-Hartley Act. The Taft-Hartley Act (61 Stat. 136-62 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1952)), which according to its § (1) (61 Stat. 136-37 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 141(a) (1952)) may be cited as the "Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,"
contains five titles, only title I of which comprises the NLRA, as amended. The NLRB
is empowered to enforce title I only. Other federal agencies are concerned with the re-
maining titles.
11 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The right of the collective
bargaining agent to act independently of the expressed or unexpressed wishes of its
members may be limited by its constitution. An example of this is contained in article
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At the instant recognition is accorded a union by an employer,
any number of employees affected, short of a majority, may desire
not to be represented by the union or any union; they may be, in fact,
antagonistic to unions. Additionally, any number of the employees,
whether they desire or do not desire to be represented by their collec-
tive bargaining agent, may take a position opposite to it when a par-
ticular issue arises. Finally, any number-large or small-of the
employees constituting the majority which originally selected the union
may thereafter have changed their desires. However, if the exclusive
bargaining representative has been selected pursuant to a National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election, absent unusual conditions,
the representative retains its right to bargain on behalf of all the
employees for at least a year after the certification following the elec-
tion.12 Also, if the employer and the union have executed a collective
bargaining agreement which by its terms runs in excess of one year,
irrespective of whether recognition was accorded the union pursuant
to an election, NLRB contract bar rules may preclude the decertifica-
tion 3 or other elimination of the union as the bargaining agent until the
contract expires or until it has been in effect for two years, whichever
occurs earlier. 14
Secondly, the great majority of collective bargaining agreements
now in existence contain some form of union security clause. Such
clauses are found especially in the industries in which the giant corpora-
tions exist, each employing thousands of employees. Most union se-
curity clauses provide for a union shop, whereby attainment of mem-
bership in the union within a certain number of days after employment
commences is a condition of continued employment. It is this type of
arrangement which is suggested by the proviso to section 8(a)(3)"'
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which in pertinent
part states:
[N]othing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor prac-
tice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such em-
ployment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
later....
50, §§ 1-2 of the constitution of the UAW, pertaining to strike authorization. The right
also may be limited by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
12 NLRB v. Brooks, 343 U.S. 96 (1954).
13 Section 9(c) (1) (a) (ii) of the NLRA, as amended (61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ i59(c)(1)(a)(ii) (1952)).
14 Pacific Coast Ass'n. of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 992 (1958).
15 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), as amended, 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1952).
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The prevalence of union security clauses results in union member-
ship of hundreds of thousands of employees who, given their choice,
undoubtedly would not have joined in the first place, or having joined,
would withdraw their memberships. Labor organizations are frequently
referred to as voluntary organizations and in respect to the bulk of
their activities they are properly so defined. For many members of
American labor organizations, their membership is voluntary in the full
sense of the word but for many others it undoubtedly is not.16
Next, the concept of mandatory and permissive subjects of col-
lective bargaining has expanded considerably since the passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935. Employers must bargain collectively within the
meaning of sections 8(a) (5)17 and 9(a)18 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. Rest and lunch
periods,1" seniority plans,20 vacation plans,21 pension plans,22 merit in-
creases, group insurance,24 Christmas bonuses customarily granted,
25
and plans for employee acquisition of the employer's capital stock
wherein the employer contributes part of the purchase money26 are
indicative of the breadth of the mandatory subject matters about which
employers must bargain when so requested by the collective bargaining
agent. Beyond the areas of subject matters about which bargaining is
mandatory, although neither of the parties is required to do so, they
may voluntarily bargain about any subject matter they choose, pro-
vided public policy is not violated. The area in which the employee
is free to bargain individually with his employer 7 and to otherwise
16 Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949) sets out the NLRB's narrow
interpretation of "membership" as the term is used in the proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, as amended.
17 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952).
18 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
19 National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1948).
20 NLRB v. Proof Co., 242 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1957).
21 Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444, 470 (1940).
22 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
23 NLRB v. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948).
24 Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
25 NLRB v. Niles Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
26 Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 909 (1956).
27 The provisos to § 9(a) of the NLRA, as amended, (61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952)) state: "Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
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determine his conditions of employment diminishes proportionately
as the area in which his collective bargaining agent successfully bar-
gains with the employer expands. Without doubt, it is because of practi-
cal necessity that many employees "voluntarily" join unions which
have attained majority status. Even in the absence of a union security
clause, the power a strong union possesses to affect the employees'
working lives is so great it is often foolhardy not to join.
Finally, unions, employers, and communities in which heavy con-
centrations of unions and their members are to be found have in many
instances greatly increased in size and complexity in the past few
decades.2" The size of the membership of many international unions
has expanded greatly in the past few decades. Local unions, as a result,
have increased in size and number and in many instances have been
chartered in geographical areas located thousands of miles from the
central headquarters of their internationals. Unions have won bar-
gaining rights in industries newly created in the past few decades and
in industries which were unorganized previously. This expansion has
resulted, in the case of many unions, in a more complex development
and arrangement of their internal structures. Regions, districts, coun-
cils, conferences, and executive boards are illustrative of the different
and overlapping levels of organization of the internal government of
unions.
At the same time, corporations with thousands of employees on
their payrolls and with installations scattered among the several
states of the United States have become commonplace. In some
instances, employers in the same field have grouped together and
bargained collectively with the union or unions involved on an
industry-wide basis. In other instances, two or more unions with
related interests have combined or closely coordinated their efforts
while bargaining with an employer or group of employers.
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representa-
tive has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment."
28 By 1956, membership of the Teamsters union had reached 1,368,082, that of the
UAW, 1,320,513, and the Steelworkers, 1,250,000. There were six unions in the United
States in 1956 whose membership exceeded one-half million. U. S. Dep't. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National & International Unions in the United
States, 1957. (BLS Bull. 1222) at 11. The total complement of employees of General
Motors Corporation working in the United States reached 312,013 in 1959 (G.M. Ann.
Rep. 1959 at 15). During the same period, United States Steel Corporation had an aver-
age of 200,329 employees (U.S. Steel Corp. Ann. Rep. 1959). By 1960 the population of
metropolitan Chicago had expanded to 6,171,517, metropolitan Detroit to 3,743,447,
metropolitan Los Angeles to 6,668,975, and metropolitan New York to 10,602,382. This
represents increases of 19.2%, 24.1%, 52.7%, and 11%, respectively, for those areas
over 1950. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Preliminary Reports-Popula-
tion Summaries 10-12 Table 3. (P.C. at 3-4 (Oct. 1960)).
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The development of the intricate and competitive order in which
we find ourselves today, including the expansion of the federal, state,
and local governments into new fields of activity and control, has
greatly increased the impact on each of us of the social, political, and
economic decisions made by others. Because of their diverse member-
ship, unions are especially interested in, and affected by, such decisions.
If the community tacitly engages in discriminatory housing practices
which adversely affect certain religious, ethnic or racial groups, the
membership of the union is affected; if the community's business
climate either encourages or discourages the movement to or from the
community of new businesses, the members are affected. The attitudes
and positions of political parties and candidates for public office may
vary considerably concerning workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation, social security, and the myriad other laws which affect
the union and other members of the community with varying degrees
of directness and intensity.
The day has passed in most industries for employees effectively
to bargain individually and directly with their employers concerning
their conditions of employment. The individual employee has become
more and more dependent upon his bargaining agent to protect and
improve his conditions of employment and general station in life. And
since his bargaining agent's activities have expanded with our changing
times to the point that the direct wages earned and the number of hours
worked have become but a small part of the total area of such activities,
the result is frequent and natural conflict within the union structure
concerning narrow issues and broad ideologies. It appears that as
society becomes more complex, increasingly divergent opinions de-
velop within the union concerning the best solutions to issues and
problems in which the membership is interested, especially when
broad social, political, and economic implications exist. Issues and
problems before the union must be resolved in the manner which is
of greatest benefit to the membership as a whole. This means that
the individual whose narrower interests lose out will often feel he has
been abused by his union leaders. This problem is not uniquely
labor's. Today, almost all action which has a significant impact upon
the community is taken by groups or associations of individuals. It
is through our political organizations, schools, churches, corporations,
unions, professional societies, and other associations that, to a material
degree, we determine our way of life. Disgruntled individuals, both
with and without just cause, can be found in all these organizations.
One of the challenges we face in our increasingly pluralistic society
is to provide adequate machinery within these organizations to enable
the non-conforming member to exercise his rights. This is especially
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important when unions are involved because, as we have seen, they
possess powers, granted by law, to make binding determinations which
vitally affect the employment conditions of their members, many of
whom are affiliated with their unions only because of contractual com-
pulsion or practical necessity. In such circumstances, there can be no
internal union democracy unless adequate machinery exists to resolve
internal disputes with justice for all involved. In this context, it is the
writer's observation that by far most challenges to the decisional activ-
ities of union officials concerning internal union matters properly go
only to the soundness of the judgments exercised and not to the integrity
of the officials involved.
II
THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE UNION
Democracy, as most Americans define it, is prevalent in those
governments where the executive, legislative, and judicial functions
reside in three separate branches, each of which acts independently of
the others. Conversely, in those governments where one of these
branches overwhelmingly dominates the others, the American brand
of democracy is scanty or non-existent. As we have seen, the concept of
exclusive bargaining representation whereby the majority determines
for everyone in the unit who the bargaining agent shall be has been
firmly implanted into American labor law, and the union security
clause has become an integral part of most collective bargaining agree-
ments. These two factors have made unions governing-if not quasi-
governmental-bodies with respect to the broad field of activities
directly and indirectly involved in the employment relationship.
The legislative functions of unions are usually performed at the
international level by their constitutional conventions and executive
boards and at the local level by the memberships at their general
meetings. The executive functions are performed at the international
and local levels by the officers, executive boards, and councils. The
imbalance exists in respect to the judicial functions. In many instances
the very decision or action the aggrieved member desires to appeal
has been promulgated by the official or officials who will sit in judg-
ment on the appeal. This is hardly the separate judicial branch of
government contemplated for rendering decisions in a democratic way.
At the local union level, the judicial process ordinarily involves
either trials of members by local trial tribunals or appeals from actions
and decisions of local officials. Of the seventy unions examined by
Bromwich,' he found that constitutional provisions governing the
29 Bromwich, Union Constitutions, A Report to The Fund for the Republic 33
(1959).
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selection of the tribunals which conduct trials of members accused of
misconduct were as follows:
Number
Trial Tribunal of Unions Membership
Local executive board 26 5,516,052
Appointed by president of the local 8 2,135,763
Elected by membership 18 4,367,929
Local meeting is trial board 6 533,784
Trial board arrangements left to locals 9 3,075,614
No provisions 3 222,052
Local union memberships tend to divide into incumbent and
opposition factions. Not infrequently the basis of charges that a mem-
ber has violated union rules stems from such factionalism. The mem-
ber against whom charges have been filed (and who is in the disfavor
of local union officials because he is in the opposing faction) finds
little solace in the procedures used to select those who sit in judgment
on the charges against him: the tribunal which tries him is either
constituted of those with whom he is in disfavor or else selected or
elected by them.
In this respect, it is significant that the UAW amended its
constitution in 1957, when its Public Review Board was created,
to overcome objectionable local trial procedures whereby the majority
of those in attendance at a general membership meeting elected the
trial committee which acted as judge and jury in the case. The 1957
amendment provided for the selection of the trial tribunal by drawing
at random a given number of names of the members attending the
first local meeting held at least five days after the member has been
notified of the charges against him. This is done by placing cards
bearing the names of the members attending that meeting into a
container. The order in which the names are drawn, by chance, from
the container determines the composition of the tribunal. Provision for
peremptory challenge is made.3 0
In most unions, the member who wishes to appeal the decision of
the tribunal which rendered a judgment against him or who wishes
to appeal a local action or decision unconnected with the trial of
charges may find himself with the unhappy prospect suggested above:
depending upon the particular union constitution involved and the
level at which the dispute arose, his appeal must address local or inter-
national officials or, ultimately, both. Thus, his complaint will be re-
30 Art. 30, § 7 of 1959 constitution of the UAW. Unless otherwise indicated, refer-
ences herein are to the 1959 edition of that document.
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viewed by those who may be in political or other factional alliance
with the individuals whose action or decision is being appealed.
In some unions the tribunal of last resort within the union's
internal appeal structure is the international executive board. More
often, the constitutional convention serves this function. Neither body
is an ideally neutral and impartial tribunal for this purpose, especially
when the issues involved have a background of union politics. In the
case of the international executive board, political alliances often
exist between local and international officials just as they do, for in-
stance, between state and local government officials. Experience also
reveals that international executive board members are often hand-
picked by the international president to run for office. Each may be
aware when he passes judgment on an appeal that he needs the support
of the other.
The convention, the supreme authority in almost every American
international union, also falls far short of being an ideal reviewing
tribunal. Of the seventy unions sampled by Bromwich,31 thirty-four
held their conventions at intervals exceeding two years. Depending
upon when it arises, the appeal thus may be inordinately prolonged.
Among the larger unions, the delegates who attend constitutional con-
ventions number in the thousands. This necessitates many of the
conventions' activities being handled by committees at all stages
except the final, formalized one. This is especially true in the handling
of appeals, because more often than not they involve thousands of
words of evidence and arguments, and voluminous documents. The
convention committees which deal with various matters, including
appeals, in forty-nine of the seventy unions Bromwich sampled were
appointed by the international president, and in eleven by the inter-
national executive board.3 Thus, in sixty of the seventy sampled cases
the international president or executive board, through the power of
selection of the appeals committee of the convention, controlled to
some degree the ultimate review the convention accorded appeals.
III.
EXTERNAL REVIEW OF INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS
The question arises whether a member who is dissatisfied with the
internal review his union offers may successfully seek relief from the
courts in lieu of using the internal procedures. There are several
hurdles which the member desiring to do so must first surmount. In
some jurisdictions, unions cannot be sued as entities although the
nature of the relief sought often makes them indispensable parties to
31 Bromwich, op. cit. supra note 29, at 9.
32 Id. at 13.
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the action. This entails the use of a class suit, at best a difficult pro-
cedure.33 In some circumstances, the member who brings his union
into court may also encounter the common law rule prohibiting a
member from suing an unincorporated association for damages because
one can't sue oneself.34 The member also may be required in his court
action to show that a property right he possesses has been invaded.35
These, and other rules which make it difficult for a member to sue his
union in court, are of local or limited application, depending upon the
nature of the cause and the jurisdiction in which the court is located.
The most formidable hurdle facing the member who wishes to go
directly into court to enforce his rights vis-a-vis his union is the rule in
most jurisdictions requiring that he exhaust the appeal procedures with-
in the union's structure before initiating court action, where the union
constitution so requires.36 Almost all international constitutions con-
tain some such requirement. Exception to the exhaustion rule is made
where the internal remedy would be "futile, illusory or vain, or amount
to a practical denial of justice." 37
In the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,38 Congress created a significant change in the relationship of
the courts to the internal affairs of labor organizations which represent
employees of employers engaged in industries affecting interstate com-
merce. The basic policy of the United States Government prior to
1959 was to refrain from interfering with union affairs unless the af-
fairs involved or affected the employment relationship of a member or
members with a particular employer or group of employers, or, indepen-
dent of their union setting, unless the affairs were in violation of the
criminal or civil law. The 1935 Wagner Act represented an effort by
33 See Earls v. Sayen, 281 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1960).
34 Cf., Wright v. Local 501, UAW, PRB Case No. 29 (Dec. 10, 1959). For purposes
of suit for damages an expelled member probably is in a more formidable position than
the unexpelled member. See, e.g., IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Taylor v.
Plumbers Union, 337 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
35 Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1479 (1947) cites and discusses cases which have applied this
rule.
36 Duffy v. Kelly, 353 Mich. 682, 689, 91 N.W.2d 916, 920 (1958). The 6th Circuit
appears to follow the rule. See Gray v. Reuther, 201 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1952), citing
Reigel v. Harrison, 157 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1946). Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1462 (1947) dis-
cusses the exhaustion rule as it is applied to cases involving the suspension and expulsion
of members.
37 Anderson v. Painters Local 318, 338 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1960). Summers,
"Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951), states the
principles and cites cases involving the exceptions to the exhaustion rule as they apply
to disciplinary cases.
38 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act),
73 Stat. 519-546 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
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Congress to set out fair rules of conduct for employers to follow with
respect to the declared right of their employees to self-organization and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The 1947 amendments
to the Wagner Act, as set out in title I of the Taft-Hartley Act, con-
stituted a change of direction by Congress whereby effort was made
to establish fair rules of conduct for labor organizations also. The rules
of fair conduct Congress imposed upon unions in 1947 pertain to their
relationships with employers and employees with whom they are con-
cerned. In the case of their own members, however, it is only action by
unions which affects the members' employment relationship which
Congress undertook to regulate. Section 8 (b) (1) (A) 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, makes it an unfair labor practice for
labor organizations or their agents to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the right guaranteed in section 7 to engage in, or to re-
frain from engaging in, concerted activity as defined therein. The
proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A), however, states its restrictions "shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership there-
in ....,40
Among other things provided for in the omnibus Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 is protection, including
judicial relief, for union members concerning certain aspects of their
membership relationship with their unions even though their employ-
ment relationship is not involved. In this act, Congress has sought to
police many of the internal activities of unions. In this significant en-
deavor, Congress, in title I of the 1959 act, established a Bill of Rights
providing for equal privileges for all members to participate in mem-
bership meetings and elections (section 101(a) (1)); freedom to meet
and assemble freely with other members and to express views and
opinions at union meetings without reprisals (section 101(a)(2));
limitations upon the circumstances in which dues, initiation fees, and
assessments may be increased (section 101(a) (3)) and fines levied
(section 101 (a) (5)). Additionally, section 101 (a) (4) provides:
Protection of the Right To Sue.-No labor organization shall limit
the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court,
or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of
whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the
right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness
39 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1952).
40 This right of labor organizations is fully recognized by NLRB decisions. Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954), is frequently cited in support of
this proposition.
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in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to peti-
tion any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Pro-
vided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reason-
able hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of
time) within such organization, before instituting legal or admini-
strative proceedings against such organizations or any officer there-
of: And provided further, That no interested employer or employer
association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or partici-
pate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance,
or petition.
District courts of the United States have been given jurisdiction in
section 102 to grant relief in instances where title I rights have been
infringed. Title II pertains to the reporting duties of unions and em-
ployers and their representatives. In title III Congress provided safe-
guards pertaining to the establishment of trusteeships whereby control
and operation of subordinate bodies is assumed by the parent labor
organization. Federal district courts have been granted jurisdiction to
entertain actions filed either by the Secretary of Labor4 or by members
of unions in instances where it is alleged that certain sections of title
III have been violated. Section 401 of title IV outlines certain stand-
ards of conduct for union elections and provides relief in sub-section
(h) where union constitutional provisions pertaining to the removal of
elected officials are inadequate. A member may file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor that section 401 has been violated provided he:
•.. has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and
bylaws of such organization and of any parent body, or
... has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final
decision within three calendar months after their invocation....42
Title V provides safeguards pertaining to the fiduciary responsibilities
and bonding of certain classes of representatives of labor organizations
and the lending of money by labor organizations to their officers and
employees, and prohibits the payment by such organizations of fines
levied against officers and employees upon conviction of any wilful
violation of the act.
As discussed herein, the UAW constitution grants jurisdiction to
its Public Review Board to act as the tribunal of last resort in respect
to appeals of certain types of actions, decisions, and penalties affecting
members and subordinate bodies. It seems clear that the "reasonable
hearing procedures" contemplated by section 101(a) (4) of the 1959
act, quoted above in its entirety, include, in the case of a UAW mem-
41 The Secretary of Labor may take action pursuant to this title only if a written
complaint by a member or subordinate body of the union has been filed with him.
Section 304(a).
42 Section 402(a)(1) and (2).
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ber, exhaustion of an appeal to the PRB when the UAW constitution
gives that body jurisdiction over the controversy. 3
Within certain time limits, section 402 (a) (1) and (2) require
exhaustion or invocation of the union's internal remedies before a
complaint alleging a title IV election procedures violation may be filed
with the Secretary of Labor. The language of this section makes it as
clear as in the case of section 101 (a) (4) that invocation of the jurisdic-
tion of the PRB procedures, where it has jurisdiction, is contemplated
as the final step in exhausting the UAW's internal remedies before com-
plaining to the Secretary of Labor.
To date two court cases have been adjudicated in which the ex-
haustion requirements of the act have been considered in connection
with the PRB. In Gray v. Reuther,44 the complaint alleged that cer-
tain conduct of International President Reuther and other UAW offi-
cials constituted, among other things, a violation of title I of the act.
The court held the pleadings lacked sufficiently specific allegations of
ultimate fact to allege a cause of action pursuant to the act. In any
event, the court concluded, there was insufficient showing in the com-
plaint that reasonable hearing procedures do not exist within the UAW
and plaintiff's failure to invoke them was fatal. Significantly, the court
observed that a "by-pass method to [the] Public Review Board" was
provided for in the constitution and the clear import of the court's re-
marks was that invocation of the PRB's processes was a condition
precedent to the institution of the action before the court.
Substantially the same matter was relitigated before a different
member of the same court in a second cause also entitled Gray v. Reu-
ther.45 This time the complaint alleged, among other things, that title I,
IV, and V violations had occurred. The court stated that "it is essential
in matters of this kind that the plaintiff first exhaust the intra-union
administrative remedies. Mere allegation of futility is insufficient ...
[D]efendant's counsel has offered an expedited hearing before its Pub-
lic Review Board, which would seem to indicate the lack of a showing
of futility." In addition to its observation pertaining to the invocation
43 In appeals pursuant to Article 32 of the constitution of the UAW of cases over
which the PRB has jurisdiction, a member in fact has a choice of invoking the PRB's
jurisdiction or appealing to the next constitutional convention (Art. 32, § 9 of the con-
stitution). He may not use both forums except in the circumstances outlined in Art.
32, § 12, of the constitution.
44 Civil No. 20275, ED. Mich. (Sept. 19, 1960). The decision was delivered orally
from the bench by Judge Ralph M. Freeman and was later transcribed by the official
court reporter at the instance of one of the parties. The transcript does not appear in
the court's file of the case.
45 Civil No. 20477, ED. Mich. (Nov. 3, 1960). An Opinion and Order of Dismis-
sal, as yet unreported, appears in the file of the case, decided by Judge Fred W. Kaess.
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of the processes of the PRB, the court in dismissing the complaint, held
the exhaustion of internal remedies requirements of the act apply not
only to title I, but to title IV and V proceedings also.
Under what circumstances do sections 101 (a) (4) and 402 (a) (1)
and (2) excuse UAW members from completely exhausting their
union's internal appeals procedures, including appeal to the PRB? Sec-
tion 402 (a) (1) and (2) is easier to analyze in this respect than its title
I counterpart, section 101(a) (4). If a violation of title IV election
procedures allegedly has occurred, a member may file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary, in turn, files an action with an
appropriate United States district court if there is probable cause to be-
lieve the complaint has merit.
48
Before qualifying to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to section 402 (a) (1) and (2), a member must invoke his
union's internal procedures; thereafter, he must exhaust the internal
remedies available, unless no final decision has been reached by the
union within three months after he has invoked its procedures. Upon
the expiration of the three-month period, the member may file his com-
plaint with the Secretary. The Secretary, presumably, has both the
jurisdiction and the duty to process the complaint immediately since
he must commence civil court action within sixty days after the filing
of a meritorious complaint by a member. The appropriate United
States district court with which an action is commenced is charged with
the duty to resolve the issue and take the remedial action described in
section 402 (c). It is clear Congress intended to give unions only three
months during which they are to have the exclusive right to resolve sec-
tion 401 disputes; thereafter the member may, if he chooses, seek ex-
ternal aid.
Section 101(a) (4), however, does not lend itself to such facile in-
terpretation. Even before the ink was dry on the statute as finally
enacted, sharp division arose among labor lawyers concerning a basic
interpretation of that section's proviso that a "member may be required
to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-
month lapse of time) within [the union], before instituting legal or ad-
ministrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer there-
of."
46 Compare § 10(b) of the NLRA, as amended, (61 Stat. 146-47 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1952)), whereby any person may file a charge with that Board's general
counsel that an unfair labor practice has occurred. It is solely the general counsel, or
his agent, who decides whether formal action in the form of complaint before the NLRB
should be instituted. Section 3(d) of the NLRA, as amended, (61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1952)); Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361, 364-65
(1948).
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There appears to be unanimity of opinion that Congress intended
and the proviso requires that the union be given the exclusive right for
four months after invocation of its procedures to resolve the dispute.
During that period, outside agencies may not interfere in the matter,
provided the internal hearing procedures are reasonable. After the
union has had a four-month opportunity to resolve the dispute and its
appeal procedures have not been exhausted, the member may seek as-
sistance from an outside forum. 1 Divergent opinions exist concerning
the effect of the proviso once the four-month period has expired. The
principal question is whether the outside forum should proceed im-
mediately to resolve the dispute.
It may surprise some readers that John F. Kennedy, now President
and then a United States Senator and chairman of the conference com-
mittee which considered and reported out the Landrum-Griffin bill,
made this statement on the floor of the Senate when that body was
considering section 101 (a) (4) :48
The protection of the right to sue provision originated in the Senate
bill and was adopted verbatim in the Landrum-Griffin bill except
that the first proviso limiting exhaustion of internal hearing pro-
cedures was changed from 6 months to 4 months. The basic intent
and purpose of the proviso was to insure the right of a union mem-
ber to resort to the courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures
without interference or frustration of that right by a labor organiza-
tion. On the other hand, it was not, and is not, the purpose of the
law to eliminate existing grievance procedures established by union
constitutions for redress of alleged violation of their internal gov-
erning laws. Nor is it the intent or purpose of the provision to in-
validate the considerable body of State and Federal court decisions
of many years standing which require, or do not require, the ex-
haustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention depending
upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of the facts
and circumstances of a particular case. So long as the union mem-
ber is not prevented by his union from resorting to the courts, the
intent and purpose of the "right to sue" provision is fulfilled, and
any requirements which the court may then impose in terms of
pursuing reasonable remedies within the organization to redress
violation of his union constitutional rights will not conflict with
the statute. The doctrine of exhaustion of reasonable internal
union remedies for violation of union laws is just as firmly estab-
lished as the doctrine of exhausting reasonable administrative
agency provisions prior to action by the courts.
471 In practice it is the rare case in which a union's internal appeal procedures are
exhausted within a four-month period. Even with herculean efforts by everyone involved,
it is doubtful this can be accomplished within most unions' procedures if proper notice,
hearing, opportunity to file briefs, to study the record, and to take other appropriate
action are to exist at the different stages of the appeal.
48 log Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959).
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Relying heavily on this statement, one school argues strenuously that
the proviso to section 101 (a) (4) changed nothing concerning the ex-
haustion requirement except the right of a union to penalize a member
for utilizing an outside forum. It is argued that those jurisdictions
which have required exhaustion of internal remedies in the circum-
stances of a given case should continue to do so even when the cause
of action is premised on a title I Bill of Rights violation. However, it
is argued, the member may be penalized by his union for commencing
litigation in an outside forum in violation of the constitution only in the
case in which such action is taken before the union has had a four-
month opportunity to resolve the dispute without outside interference. 9
The opposing school argues an outside forum should not only as-
sert jurisdiction but should immediately process to completion on the
merits a case filed with it by a member under title I, provided only the
four-month internal exhaustion period has expired. As it interprets
section 101(a) (4), the language, "No labor organization shall limit
the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court,"
prevents the union from imposing any penalty for doing so either be-
fore or after the four-month period has expired, absent bad faith, and
the proviso prevents the outside tribunal from granting relief until the
internal procedures have been exhausted or the four-month period has
transpired.
In support of the argument that the proviso has not altered the
exhaustion rule is the principle, universally accepted by our courts,
that the legislative history of any act is the proper concern of those
charged with its interpretation. Since Senator Kennedy was chairman
of the conference committee which dealt with the bill, his explicit ut-
terances on the Senate floor in explanation of the meaning of the pro-
viso ordinarily would be entitled to great weight. However, those who
ultimately argue before the courts in favor of a contrary interpretation
will undoubtedly observe that Senator Kennedy uttered his statement
on the Senate floor in connection with the submission to that body of
the report of the conference committee on the bill. The House con-
ferees were, of course, in no position to challenge before the Senate the
statement made by Senator Kennedy. House discussion of the report of
the conference committee took place on September 4, 1959, the day fol-
lowing Senator Kennedy's remarks, but the proviso to section 101(a)
(4) was not considered in detail.5 ° Representative Griffin, after whom
49 Unless the discussion herein specifically indicates to the contrary, the assumption
is that the internal procedures involved are reasonable in the sense the proviso to § 101
(a) (4) uses the term.
50 The sectional index of I Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 at XVIII lists the pages of that reference which contain the
congressional debate specifically directed to § 101 (a) (4).
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the act has in part been popularly named, appears to have come the
closest to reaching the point raised by Senator Kennedy. Representa-
tive Griffin's interpretation, as inserted in the appendix to the Congres-
sional Record, 51 apparently was contrary to Senator Kennedy's:
Section 101(a) (4) of the bill of rights is designed to protect the
right of a union member to resort to courts and administrative
agencies. The proviso which limits exhaustion of internal remedies
is not intended to impose restrictions on a union member which do
not otherwise exist, but rather to place a maximum on the length of
time which may be required to exhaust such remedies. In other
words, existing decisions which require, or do not require, exhaus-
tion of such remedies are not to be affected except as a time limit
of 4 months is superimposed.
Proponents of the argument that the proviso does not change the
exhaustion rule would appear to gain comfort also from the choice of
language used in section 402(a) (1) and (2). As we have seen, that
section states that a member who has not obtained a final decision
within the union's appeal structure within three months in connection
with a title IV election dispute is free thereafter to invoke the services
of the Secretary of Labor and have his complaint processed without
delay. The language selected by Congress to accomplish this is un-
equivocal; it can be argued with some force that had Congress in-
tended a similar result to flow from the proviso to section 101(a) (4),
presumably it would have used comparable language. 2
However, Congress was aware, surely, that with few exceptions
internal appeals are not, and reasonably can not be finally resolved
within the four-month limitation of the proviso to section 101(a) (4).
If after four months a member still must exhaust the union's internal
procedures before the courts may take decisive action, notwithstanding
the terms of the proviso, the effect of the proviso would appear minimal
in its practical application. 3 The proviso would constitute no impetus
to unions to create speedier internal appeals procedures.
Undoubtedly Congress intended to take strong remedial action
when it passed the Landrum-Griffin Act. The widespread publicity
given to alleged wrongdoing by certain labor leaders, as revealed by
51 Id. at 1811, 105 Cong. Rec. App. at A7915 (Sept. 9, 10, 1959).
52 Compare § 501(b) which provides for enforcement of the fiduciary responsibilities
of union representatives outlined in § 501(a). Any member of the union involved is al-
lowed to sue the representative allegedly breaching his responsibility "within a reasonable
time" after the union officers with the authority are requested and fail to sue or recover
damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief.
53 Statutes "must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end
to be attained." Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934).
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the McClellan Committee, 4 whether true or false, and if true, whether
representative or non-representative of actual conditions, had placed
the electorate and Congress in a frame of mind which demanded effec-
tive corrective legislation. It would appear that Congress intended,
when it wrote the proviso into section 101 (a) (4), to offer more than
the limited relief which will be granted if the interpretation suggested
by the statement of Senator Kennedy on the floor of the Senate is
adopted. If that interpretation is adopted, it would appear to follow
that a member may with impunity file a civil action against his union
without first invoking its internal procedures only if the procedures are
not "reasonable." The difficulty is that the word "reasonable" is cap-
able of no exact definition in the context in which it is used in the
proviso; often the member may not know if the procedures are reason-
able or unreasonable in the circumstances of his case until a court has
passed on the question. He may commence his outside action without
invoking the union's internal procedures upon the advice of an attorney
that they are unreasonable. It is unlikely that Congress desired to place
or keep the member in the awkward position of subjecting himself to
severe penalty by his union for commencing outside action if it is sub-
sequently determined that under all the circumstances of his particular
case his argument, made in good faith, that the internal procedures
were unreasonable cannot be sustained. As of the date of the prepara-
tion of this paper, there have been no appellate court cases which have
interpreted the proviso. In the reported decisions of the United States
district courts which so far have been concerned with its interpretation,
the courts found it unnecessary to consider the full implications of the
proviso.
Where the internal appeal procedures of a union are unreasonable
because unconscionable delay is involved, or the pertinent constitu-
tional provisions or other union rules or the manifest attitude of the
union's officials who would sit in judgment preclude a fair hearing, un-
doubtedly most courts will continue, as they do today, to assert juris-
diction over the matter, notwithstanding the failure of the member to
invoke the internal procedures. If the procedures are reasonable in
the above sense, the writer suggests most courts will stress the per-
missive rather than the mandatory aspects of the proviso. The proviso
merely describes the conditions precedent to a member's "instituting"
outside proceedings against a union or any of its officers; it does not
command the courts, if the conditions have been fulfilled, to process the
case to completion. In this way, the danger, if it exists, of the courts
54 The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Man-
agement Field, created by S. Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 103 Cong. Rec. 1264-
65 (1957).
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becoming inundated with title I cases can be successfully controlled by
the courts themselves. At the same time, the courts will have more
freedom than many decisions prior to the passage of the act permitted,
to pick and choose, to enter or to refrain from entering into a field ad-
mittedly esoteric and often fraught with deep emotions and well estab-
lished but subtle practices. Each case preliminarily will be examined
by the court before it makes a determination of whether to resolve its
merits or hold it in abeyance pending exhaustion of internal remedies.
Prior invocation of the internal procedures and pursuit thereafter for
four months of the remedies available will constitute but one of several
factors the court will consider when deciding whether to proceed forth-
with in a title I Bill of Rights case.
What effect will the proviso have on impartial public review? If
the authoritative interpretation ultimately adopted is that the proviso
does not change the rules concerning the exhaustion of internal reme-
dies, obviously the advantages and disadvantages to unions of the use
of a system of impartial public review will remain as before. If it is
determined ultimately that the proviso guarantees the right to a mem-
ber to institute title I action against his union no later than four months
after invoking its internal procedures and to have the action imme-
diately processed to completion, the role of impartial public review will
have been dealt a blow, the size of which is open to speculation. Those
members who would not continue to belong to their union if the col-
lective bargaining agreement or circumstances did not necessitate it
may be tempted to ignore their right to impartial public review where
the union has provided it if they know they can obtain court review
four months after invoking, but not exhausting, the union's internal
remedies.
An ultimate determination that the courts will not proceed pur-
suant to the authority granted in the proviso until the union's pro-
cedures have been exhausted, if they are reasonable under all the
circumstances, should make impartial public review of internal affairs
more enticing to those unions in a position to adopt it. The courts
will be less likely, it would appear, to interfere with the union whose
procedures afford final appeal of internal disputes to a group of im-
partial, eminent citizens than with the union whose procedures do not.
There is a strong tradition among trade unionists against the use
of outside tribunals to resolve internal union disputes. In the process-
ing of cases before the UAW's Public Review Board this tradition has
revealed itself. There have been significant instances among PRB cases
in which the aggrieved member, although obviously disconsolate be-
cause of what in his opinion amounted to shabby treatment he had
received from union officials, at the same time made it clear he intended
19611
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to keep the issue within the family of the union. Whatever the courts
might decide concerning the effect of the proviso upon the exhaustion
of remedies rule, there will be a broad area remaining in which im-
partial public review can play a significant role.
IV.
IMPARTIAL PUBLIc REvIEw IN OPERATION
A. Extent of Its Adoption by Unions
In the past year the writer has had the opportunity to discuss im-
partial public review with labor leaders from Asia, Europe, and South
America, visiting the United States under the auspices of the United
States Government. Although certain of these individuals indicated
their countries have bodies which perform functions somewhat similar
to those of the UAW's Public Review Board, it was revealed that such
functions were performed by the government or pursuant to powers
granted by the government. The writer is unaware of any union which
functions outside of the United States and Canada which has a system
of impartial public review based solely upon authority stemming from
its membership.
Of the three North American unions which have adopted impartial
public review systems, the Upholsterers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO (UIU), the first to do so, created its Public Appeal
Board in 1953. 5 Since its creation, the UIU Board has decided but one
case and is presently considering another. The relatively limited mem-
bership of the UIU, the limitation of the jurisdiction of its board to
disciplinary case appeals,5 7 and the replacement of the trial boards
which hear the evidence and make recommendations (formerly com-
posed of general executive board members) with outside, legally trained
hearing officers who are not otherwise connected with the UIU, 8 un-
doubtedly have contributed to the relative scarcity of cases. 59 In any
event, because the UIU's Public Appeal Board has decided but a single
55 UIU General Laws, Art XXVI, § 6(b).
56 The UIU had approximately 55,000 members in 1956. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National & International Unions in the United
States, 1957 (B.L.S. Bull. 1222) at 45.
57 UIU General Laws, Art. XXVI, § 6(b) (i).
58 UIU General Laws, Art. XXVI, § 6(j).
59 In a letter to the writer dated Aug. 19, 1960, Arthur G. McDowell, Director,
Civil, Education & Government Affairs, UIU, stated that from the small sample of ex-
perience it appears approximately one appeal case in twenty-five or thirty is taken as
far as the UIU Public Appeal Board. In the UAW's experience, since its Public Review
Board was created, not quite one appeal case in four reaches its PRB, according to
information related to the writer by William Beckham, administrative assistant to UAW
International President Reuther.
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case to date, an examination of its activities would presently be most
limited.
In 1960 the executive board of the United Packinghouse Workers
of America, AFL-CIO (UPWA), established a committee "charged
with the responsibility of examining any situation in which it is sug-
gested, now or in the future, that a condition exists which is in viola-
tion of any of the Ethical Practices Codes."6 The committee, which is
composed of members of the executive board, investigates matters un-
der its jurisdiction and reports its findings and recommendations to the
executive board, which in turn acts on the report and recommendations.
The executive board also provided for the establishment "of an Ad-
visory Review Commission, to consist of three members, unless a
larger number appears to be desirable, with power, through appropriate
procedures, to review the good faith of the Board's action in such mat-
ters."'" At the 1960 convention of the UPWA, a resolution was adopted
approving the executive board's action in establishing the Commission.
As of October 14, 1960, the UPWA system of impartial public review,
limited to questions concerning violations of the AFL-CIO Ethical
Practices Codes, was still being formed and its procedures had not
been finally determined."
This leaves the UAW's Public Review Board as the only body
which has been sufficiently active to permit evaluation of the constitu-
tional provisions governing its procedures and powers in the context of
the activities in which it has engaged to date.
B. The UAW's Public Review Board
1. Its Origin and Composition
Undoubtedly three factors contributed to the decision to amend
the UAW constitution in April, 1957, to create the PRB. These were the
imbalance then existing in the UAW's internal appeal procedures which
resulted from the absence of an impartial judiciary, the then growing
unfavorable public opinion attributable to the increasing tempo of the
McClellan Committee, 63 and the favorable public opinion which the
60 AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical Practices, Publication No. 50, reissued May, 1958.
61 It was subsequently determined that a commission of five, otherwise not con-
nected with the union should be selected. The five selected and presently serving are:
Prof. Nathan Feinsinger, Law School, Wisconsin University; Prof. Ronald Haughton,
Wayne University (Detroit, Mich.); Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.; Rt. Rev. Msgr. John
O'Grady, Secretary, National Conference of Catholic Charities; Prof. W. Willard Wirtz,
Law School, Northwestern University.
62 The information pertaining to the Packinghouse Workers' activities in the field
of impartial public review was furnished the writer in two letters from Ralph Helstein,
that union's president, dated Sept. 28 and Oct. 14, 1960.
63 Supra note 54.
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UAW reasonably anticipated would flow from the bold action whereby
outsiders would be empowered to sit in judgment on the internal activ-
ities of the union.
The purpose of the PRB, as stated in the international constitu-
tion,614 is to insure ". . . a continuation of high moral and ethical stand-
ards in the administrative and operative practices of the international
union and its subordinate bodies. . . ." The constitutional provisions
pertaining to the selection of the PRB's membership reveal a genuine
effort to man it in such a way that the salutary purposes announced in
the constitution would be fulfilled. The PRB consists of seven mem-
bers whose terms of office are for the period, ordinarily two years, be-
tween constitutional conventions. The international president selects
the names of the candidates which, if approved by the international
executive board, the supreme authority of the union between conven-
tions,65 are submitted to the convention for ratification. Any vacancy
occurring between conventions is filled by international presidential
appointment, subject to the approval of the international executive
board. However, in such instances, it is the PRB which effectively con-
trols the appointment: the international president must fill the vacancy
by appointment of an individual selected from a list of names submitted
to him by the remaining members of the PRB. In all instances, mem-
bers of the PRB must be "impartial persons of good public repute, not
working under the jurisdiction of the UAW or employed by the Inter-
national Union or any of its subordinate bodies." 66
There are no constitutional provisions whereby a member may be
removed from PRB office. Until his term of office expires, the union is
unable to free itself from the judgments of a PRB member who has
fallen into its disfavor.
Article 31, section 8 of the UAW constitution directs the interna-
tional executive board to provide the PRB with the funds necessary for
its operations. Quarterly, pursuant to article 31, section 8, the PRB
submits a budget to the international secretary-treasurer, who is re-
quired to deposit to the PRB's account the funds required by the
budget. Presumably, if the international union were to attempt to pre-
64 Art. 31, § 1.
65 Art. 7, § l(d).
66 Art. 31, §§ 1-2 of the constitution of the UAW set out the requirements pertain-
ing to the selection of the members of the PRB and terms under which they serve. The
members presently on the Board are: Rabbi Morris Adler, chairman, Detroit; Magistrate
J. A. Hanrahan, Windsor, Ont., Canada; Rt. Rev. Msgr. George C. Higgins, Director,
Social Action Dept., National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C.; judge
Wade H. McCree, Wayne County Cir. Ct., Detroit; Dr. jean McKelvey, Cornell Uni-
versity; Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam (Methodist Episcopal Church) retired; and Prof.
W. Willard Wirtz, Law School, Northwestern University.
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vent the PRB from operating by refusing to furnish funds to it, an
interested UAW member could obtain judicial relief. Except as to the
source of its funds, the PRB is entirely independent of the UAW until
the succeeding convention when its members' terms of office expire. In
an effort to give the PRB greater financial independence than the con-
stitution requires, a practice has been established whereby a balance of
$30,000 was created in a depository in the name of the PRB; quarterly,
sufficient funds are transferred by the international secretary-treasurer
to the PRB to reimburse it for its previous quarter's expenditures. In
this way, the balance in the depository again approaches $30,000 at the
beginning of each quarter. If for any reason the PRB's income were
cut off at any given moment, it would be able to meet its financial ob-
ligations for at least a half-year at the rate it presently is expending
its funds.
The PRB maintains its own, separate office at 1408 David Stott
Building, Detroit 26, Michigan, a downtown Detroit office building,
thus satisfying the requirement of article 31, section 8 of the constitu-
tion that its office be separate and apart from any union building. The
PRB is completely autonomous concerning its professional and office
clerical staff and the accounting and other professional services of
which it avails itself. Its full time employees presently consist of an
executive director, David Y. Klein, who is an attorney with labor law
experience, and his office secretary.
From April, 1957, when it commenced its operations, through Sep-
tember 30, 1958, the PRB issued eight formal and five informal de-
cisions,17 and during the succeeding period ending September 30, 1959,
it issued two formal and seven informal decisions.0" During the past
fiscal year ending September 30, 1960, the PRB issued eighteen deci-
sions, all but one of which were formal, a marked increase of the formal
type over the previous periods. 9 Although the case inflow appears to
have increased in the past fiscal year, one factor accounting for the in-
crease is that the PRB resolved five cases during that period which had
been filed and carried over from the previous period. In addition to the
processing of the above cases, the PRB handles perhaps a hundred in-
quiries a year, of which approximately fifty to sixty are classified as in-
formal complaints, discussed in IV, B, 2 (b), infra.
67 1 PRB Ann. Rep. 7-10 (1957-1958). These thirteen decisions represent twenty-one
cases, more than a single case being involved in a single proceeding in some instances.
Formal decisions are published and made available to the public. Informal decisions, is-
sued to date only in cases rejected by the PRB without hearing for lack of jurisdiction,
are announced in the form of a letter to the parties.
08 2 PRB Ann. Rep. 1 (1958-1959).
69 3 PRB Ann. Rep. At the time of the completion of this paper the report was in
the process of being printed and hence its pagination was undetermined.
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2. The Public Review Board's Jurisdiction
(a) Ethical Practices Complaints.-By far the most frequent, dif-
ficult, and substantial type of decision the PRB has been called upon to
make during its three and one-half years of existence is that concerning
the scope of its jurisdiction, as delineated in the UAW constitution.
There are two types of matters which may reach the PRB; article 31,
section 4 complaints relating to alleged violations of the AFL-CIO
Codes of Ethical Practices, and article 32, sections 9(a) and (b) ap-
peals of actions, decisions, and penalties. There are presently six ethical
practices codes which were adopted by the AFL-CIO at various times
during 1956-57. The codes deal with local union charters, health and
welfare funds, racketeers and other undesirable elements within the
labor movement, investment and business interests of union officials,
financial practices and proprietary activities of unions, and internal
union democratic processes. The procedures set forth in article 31,
section 4, to enforce the codes, in a sense similar to those outlined in
the proviso to section 101(a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, grant to the international executive board
and its subordinate bodies exclusive jurisdiction initially to resolve
ethical practices complaints against the union and its representatives.
Thereafter, the PRB may consider the matter. The UAW appears to
have attempted sincerely to place into its constitution built-in safe-
guards which give a full measure of assurance to members that demo-
cratic procedures will prevail. Evidence of this is found in the pro-
visions of article 31, section 4(a) and (b) whereby the chairman of the
PRB must be served with a copy of each ethical practices complaint
filed with the international executive board and, thereafter, the execu-
tive board must keep him advised of the case, including its final dis-
position; further, the PRB is given the power in any such matter to act
on its own motion in the absence of an appeal to it by a complainant if
it concludes the executive board's resolution of the matter was unsatis-
factory. Most meritorious ethical practices complaints would appear
to transcend the immediate interests of the parties to the proceedings
and affect the welfare of the entire union.
Whether the PRB has authority, without a complaint having been
initiated by a member, to assert jurisdiction and undertake an investiga-
70 A power parallel to the PRB's exists among federal administrative agencies whose
purposes are to effectuate public policy but whose jurisdictions to act are dependent
upon charges or complaints being filed with them by the public. The NLRB is such an
agency. At least after formal agency complaint has issued, the NLRB may refuse to
allow a person to withdraw the charge which gave that agency jurisdiction to proceed,
if the public policy would be defeated by permitting the withdrawal. Distillery Workers
Local 1 (Schenley Distillers Corp.), 78 N.L.R.B. 504 (1948). See also, supra note 46.
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tion or examination of any action or operation of the UAW which might
involve an ethical practices codes violation has been a vexing question.
International President Reuther has publicly stated that the PRB
serves a watchdog function and is empowered to act in the field of
ethical practices codes violations in any manner it deems appropriate. 71
The PRB, on the other hand, has strongly hinted it has no such power.
In the early part of 1960, the international executive board requested
the PRB to impartially review and report to the membership and to
the public the entire matter contained in the so-called minority report
containing the "Separate Views" of the four Republican members of
the McClellan Committee. This report included charges of wrongdoing
by the international union and certain of its officers and employees in
connection with two particularly bitter strikes and a fund collected
from officers and employees of the union. The fund is maintained to
assist in meeting the incidental expenses incurred in connection with
the activities of incumbent slates of candidates in periodic union elec-
tions. The PRB requested the union to submit a bill of particulars
delineating the charges against the union and the action upon which
the charges were based. This information was requested by the PRB
to assist it in determining whether it had jurisdiction to act in the man-
ner requested by the union. The PRB, in effect, dismissed the matter
when the union responded that it was unable to furnish the particulars
requested of it.7' The difficulty in that situation was that the PRB was
asked to extend its functions beyond those it has assumed to date of
reviewing specific decisions or actions of the international executive
board or an international trial committee. 7 If the PRB were em-
powered to act sua sponte in any area in which the AFL-CIO Ethical
Practices Codes may have been violated, it would appear that it also
would have some duty to police these areas to insure to the membership
that violations of the codes were being kept at a minimum. However,
for the PRB effectively to engage in policing an area as broad as that
encompassed by the codes, a very large staff, roaming throughout the
United States and Canada, would be required. To date, the PRB has
indicated no propensity for undertaking such an investigatory, non-
judicial function.
(b) Informal Complaints Before the Public Review Board-As in-
dicated in IV, B, 1, supra, fifty or sixty informal complaints are made
to the PRB annually. UAW members, often unfamiliar with their pro-
cedural rights under the union constitution, request the PRB's office
71 UAV Press Release, March 24, 1957, p. 2.
72 No formal decision was issued and no case number given to this matter.
73 A penalty imposed by an international trial committee may be appealed directly
to the PRB. Art. 30, § 23, for example, so provides.
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for relief from action or inaction of the union or its representatives
which has adversely affected them. The problems most frequently en-
countered involve seniority and/or grievance processing. Almost invar-
iably, the member has made insufficient or no effort to process his
complaint within the internal appeal procedures. In such a situation,
the complainant is carefully instructed by the PRB staff representative
concerning his procedural rights under the UAW constitution and the
steps which must be taken under the appeal procedures before the mat-
ter is ripe for formal PRB action. In a comparatively few instances,
it appears to the PRB representative that the office of the international
president may be unaware of the subject matter of the complaint and
that an investigation by that office, depending on what is ascertained,
might result in remedial action. In such instances, for informational
purposes only, an informal report of the substance of the informal
complaint is made by the PRB to the office of the president.
Members are entitled, surely, to ascertain what their procedural
rights are under the UAW constitution. It would appear to be a proper
function for the PRB to perform this service when inquiry is made of
it by members concerning their constitutional rights. Most courts will
do no less for potential litigants who inquire concerning court proce-
dures. As to whether the PRB should go farther and contact the office
of the international president concerning informal complaints which
it has received, great care must be exercised, in the opinion of the
writer. There is always the danger that such contact, coming from a
reviewing authority, will have a coercive effect on union officials no
matter what the intent behind it may be. Suggestions or mere inquiries
from the bench often cause lawyers to seriously re-evaluate their cases
or positions. Further, unless such contacts are most carefully regulated,
word quickly might spread throughout the UAW membership that in-
stead of following the union's appeal procedures, a member might ob-
tain faster and more dramatic relief for his problem by contact with
the international union through the good offices of the PRB. Indeed, it
has been the writer's experience that too frequently those who have
contacted the PRB in hope of obtaining favorable action concerning
their informal complaints were generally aware of the union's appeal
procedures, but were desirous of short-circuiting channels or were ul-
teriorly motivated.
(c) Article 32 Appeals-Any UAW member may appeal any ac-
tion, decision, or penalty of his local union to the international execu-
tive board and thereafter to the constitutional convention. The defeat
by the local general membership of any motion constitutes action.
Hence, any member may raise any issue before the international execu-
tive board simply by submitting it to the general membership of his
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local in the form of a motion, and after its defeat, appealing to the execu-
tive board; if he is still unsuccessful, he may, as a matter of right, be
heard thereafter by the constitutional convention. This is true regard-
less of the triviality of the subject matter which may be involved or the
lack of damages, direct or indirect, to the appellant. Instead of appeal-
ing from the international executive board to the convention, the mem-
ber has the alternative of appealing to the PRB in:
Any case arising under the procedure set forth in Articles 10 (Sec-
tion 13) [dual unionism], 12 (Sections 2 and 3) [trusteeships and
related problems], 29, 30 [trials of members], 32 (Section 13)
[limitations on members commencing court or other governmental
agency action], 35 (Sections 8 and 9) [disbandment of local unions
and related problems], 38 (Sections 12 and 13) [local elections],
48 (Section 5) [misappropriation of funds and related problems] of
this Constitution, or in any other cases in which the International
Executive Board has passed upon an appeal from the action of a
subordinate body; provided that where the appeal concerns the ac-
tion or inaction relative to the processing of a grievance, the juris-
diction of the Public Review Board shall be limited to those in-
stances where the appellant has alleged before the International
Executive Board that the grievance was improperly handled because
of fraud, discrimination, or collusion with management.74
A substantial number of the cases appealed to the PRB since its incep-
tion involved the question of whether grievances were handled properly
so that the jurisdictional limitations in section 9 (b) came into play. In
no case to date has the PRB found that fraud, discrimination, or col-
lusion with management was involved in the handling of a grievance.
In the opinion of the writer, it is most wise that the constitution
grants so narrow a review by the PRB in cases involving disputes over
grievance handling. There are literally thousands of grievances every
year which members in UAW shops file or request to be filed. The mass
of cases which the PRB probably would be called upon to handle, if it
were to have jurisdiction without limitation to review grievance
handling disputes, would require a greatly increased staff and participa-
tion in decision making by the Board members on a full-time basis.
More important, the lion's share of the UAW's representation is in
shop units, each of which contains hundreds or thousands of produc-
tion and maintenance employees. Intricate and delicate understand-
ings, explicit and implicit, based on the contract and the customs and
the practices which have developed over the years and on the person-
alities involved, usually exist in such shop units; this was recognized
recently by the Supreme Court when reference was made to the ex-
istence of a common law of the shop governing the collective bargain-
74 Art. 32, §§ 9(a) and (b).
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ing process in the majority opinion in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.75 a landmark case in the field of labor arbitration law.
Pursuant to section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the majority representative is entitled to act as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate unit when bar-
gaining with the employer. In such circumstances the union and the
employer involved must be accorded freedom to dispose of grievances
in any manner they deem proper, provided their action is in good faith
and not discriminatorily motivated.76 Such freedom of action can exist
where the UAW is the bargaining representative only if its constitution
exacts from its shop officials no greater duty in handling members'
grievances than to act in good faith and in a non-discriminatory man-
ner. Basically, this is what article 32, section 9(b) prescribes.
Article 32, section 12 of the UAW constitution further limits the
jurisdiction of the PRB in cases involving appeals pursuant to article
32, section 9 of the constitution. Section 12 states in part "that in no
event shall the Public Review Board have jurisdiction to review in any
way an official collective bargaining policy of the International
Union.1 77 Again, it is difficult to quarrel with the reason behind this
limitation. Collective bargaining policies involve fundamental positions
which concern conditions of employment. Section 8(b) (2)78 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, prohibits unions from causing
or attempting to cause employers to discriminate in regard to hire or
tenure or condition of employment. A member who feels his employ-
ment relationship has been affected discriminatorily by a collective bar-
gaining policy of the UAW can file an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB and use the machinery of the federal government to test
the soundness of his position. He is also free to take the matter through
the various steps of the union's appeal procedures, ultimately to the
constitutional convention.79 If the PRB were to review official collec-
75 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The decision quoted observations made in the same vein by
Cox, "Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1498-99 (1959).
76 Absent evidence of bad faith or discriminatory motivation, the General Counsel
of the NLRB will refuse to issue a complaint against a union alleging it committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to process grievances which it claimed lacked merit.
Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-853 (Oct. 3, 1960), citing
Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 329 (1953).
77 The full implication and scope of this provision in Article 32, § 12, have yet to
be considered by the PRB. For instance, the official collective bargaining policy may be
discriminatory within the meaning of Article 32, § 9(b). See Sanders v. Local 157, UAW,
PRB Case No. 39 (Feb. 3, 1960).
78 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952).
79 These would not appear to be alternative remedies. But cf. Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), wherein the NLRB refused to entertain unfair labor practice
charges on the merits because the charging party had voluntarily participated in arbitra-
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tive bargaining policies in the context of article 32 appeals involving
grievance handling, it would be delving into the substantive aspects of
the case before it. To date, in article 32 appeal cases, the PRB, as we
shall soon see, has restricted itself in the main to safeguarding pro-
cedural rights.
3. The Scope of Public Review Board Review
Article 31, section 5, and article 32, section 11 of the UAW con-
stitution grant "hearings" before the PRB as a matter of right in those
cases in which substantial issues exist. The PRB made it abundantly
clear that the type of hearing the constitution envisages in such cir-
cumstances is the limited one parties usually enjoy when the jurisdic-
tion of the tribunal is of a review nature: oral argument, based on the
record previously made, directed to the substantial issues involved.
Only that evidence offered to it which was part of the record before the
tribunal from which the appeal was made will be considered by the
PRB unless persuasive reasons have been established by the moving
party for not having presented the evidence at an earlier stage of the
case.80 Further, the only new evidence which the PRB has accepted in
any case before it so far has been that which was incidental or supple-
mentary to the evidence already a part of the record. In this way the
scheme of the constitution, whereby the union is given the opportunity
to consider and adjust all of the disputes within its family before the
PRB enters the scene, is not thwarted. In those instances in which the
PRB has sustained the appeal before it and issues remained which had
not been reached by the lower tribunal when it considered the matter,
the case has been remanded to the union for such purpose.81 There-
after, in such a case, the matter may again be appealed to the PRB for
review of the remaining issues, if they are of the type over which the
PRB has jurisdiction.
tion proceedings, fairly conducted, between his employer and his bargaining representa-
tive in which the subject matter of the charges was adjudicated in a manner consistent
with the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
80 Rule 9 of the PRB's Rules of Procedure, Series 4, currently in effect, states in
part: "a. Additional evidence-that is, evidence in addition to that in the record trans-
mitted to the Board-may be presented only in the following situations: (1) Where
authorized by the Chairman of the panel of the Board on the basis of a written request
filed with the Board .... The request to present additional evidence shall set forth
(a) Persuasive reasons for presenting such evidence and for not having presented it at
prior hearings in the case, (b) The names of all witnesses whose testimony is desired
to be presented, (c) The relevance of the anticipated testimony of each of these witnesses
to the issues before the Board, and (d) A description of any documentary evidence to
be offered. .. ." Rule 9 was most recently applied in Telakowicz v. Local 525, UAW,
PRB Case No. 46 at 5 (Oct. 31, 1960).
81 Ann Gaikowski (Local 22, UAW), PRB Case No. 30 (Nov. 16, 1959) is illustra-
tive of such PRB action.
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In resolving the cases before it to date, the PRB appears clearly
to have been primarily concerned with the question of whether the ap-
pellants enjoyed all of the procedural rights to which they were en-
titled under the UAW constitution. In respect to substantive issues, the
PRB has unmistakably exhibited a reluctance to superimpose its judg-
ment upon that of the international executive board and any subor-
dinate bodies which earlier considered the matter. The PRB appar-
ently shares the view that "the history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards.1'8 2
In Atwan v. Ormsby,88 the PRB examined a voluminous record
involving 111 separate charges on a local union level alleging fiscal
mismanagement, illegal elections and gifts, infiltration of the local
union by criminal elements, and threats and acts of reprisal. In affirm-
ing the decision of the international executive board, the PRB stated
that the evidence as a whole supported the findings of fact and the con-
clusions reached by the international executive board and therefore, for
that case at least, it adopted the limited standard by which federal ad-
ministrative agency decisions are reviewed by the courts.84
Nor has the PRB exhibited any disposition to reach to the moral,
statutory, or common law and to reject or ignore the plain meaning of
any provision of the UAW constitution which disposes of the issues of
a case before it. In its decisions so far, the PRB has referred to such
outside sources only as an aid in interpreting the constitutional pro-
visions before it or as evidence of the soundness of its resolution of the
issues before it. Throughout the PRB's decisions is the unmistakable
theme that no rule or decision by it can be inconsistent with, or un-
authorized by, the UAW constitution, the supreme law of the union
and the source of all of the authority possessed by the PRB.85 It has
exhibited no tendency so far of becoming a Frankenstein, overpower-
ing its creator, the constitutional convention, and acting inconsistently
with the convention's desires.
4. Enforcement and Review of Public Review Board Decisions
Article 31, section 3 of the UAW constitution, explicitly in the case
of appeals pursuant to article 32 and implicitly in the case of AFL-CIO
ethical practices codes complaints pursuant to article 31, makes PRB
decisions final and binding. Will the courts enforce a PRB decision if
82 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1942).
83 PRB Consolidated Cases No. 32 (Feb. 19, 1960).
84 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Pittsburg
S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1951).
85 Oberer, "Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections," 58 Mch. L.
Rev. 55, 62-66 (1959), discusses various criteria of review available to the PRB.
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a suit for its enforcement is brought by the party victorious before it?
And will the courts review a PRB decision if the losing party before it
files an action to set aside the decision? No cases have considered these
questions yet.
If the international union or one of its subordinate bodies were to
refuse to take the specific action directed in a PRB order, the opposing
party should be able to obtain enforcement of the order in the civil
courts. The courts usually consider a union constitution as constituting
a contract between the union and its members."6 Hence, it can be ar-
gued, the PRB is a creature of the constitution, and article 31, section
3 of that instrument, which makes PRB decisions final and binding,
constitutes an enforceable agreement.
Under this theory, a member would appear to be precluded from
obtaining court review of a PRB decision adverse to him. But may
he ignore the PRB's adverse decision and commence an original action
with an appropriate court and enjoy a trial de novo? The Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 suggests in cases of
infringement of certain of its provisions that he may. In connection
with title I Bill of Rights matters, section 102 states: "Any person whose
rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any
violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appro-
priate. . . ." Sections 304(a) and 306, concerning title III trustee-
ships, and sections 402 and 403, concerning title IV elections, contain
comparable provisions. It is improbable the courts will allow the su-
perior federal policy, enunciated in the Disclosure Act of 1959, of
affording court relief to members in certain title I, III, and IV situa-
tions to be superseded by the "final and binding" provision of article
31, section 3 of the UAW constitution.
Interpretations fairly placed on a union's rules by its officials gen-
erally will be accepted by the courts.17 Additionally, the courts or-
dinarily have refused to interfere with the final resolution within a
union's appeals procedures of a dispute, absent fraud, bad faith, or
caprice.88 As a practical matter, where the PRB-a body of impartial,
eminent citizens-has rendered the final decision for the UAW concern-
ing an internal dispute, it would seem the courts will refrain from inter-
fering with the decision unless an error of law and not of judgment has
been committed.
88 Summers, supra note 37 at 1054-58.
87 English v. Cunningham, 46 L.R.R.M. 2660, 2661 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1960).
88 Fox v. Knight, 350 P.2d 177 (Ore. 1960).
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CONCLUSION
Impartial public review of internal disputes within unions must
be considered still in the experimental stage. The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 will not have the effect of elim-
inating or discouraging the use of such review by unions. Evidence of
this is the adoption since the passage of that act of a limited form of
public review by the Packinghouse Workers Union. The self-imposed
limitation by the UAW's Public Review Board of its review to proced-
ural matters in the main emphasizes the necessity for the aggrieved
UAW member to make a proper record at the trial level stage when the
evidence pertaining to the issues is established. The UAW constitution
(article 32, section 4) guarantees the right of the member to outside
representation at this stage. However, the often prohibitive cost to the
member of retaining an attorney or other consultant sufficiently special-
ized in matters of this kind usually results in the member presenting
his own case. The Upholsterers Union's system of using professional
hearing officers, otherwise unconnected with the union, at the trial stage
affords the aggrieved member a hearing before a tribunal otherwise dis-
associated from the union, at an earlier stage than the UAW's system.
An examination of the cases which have arisen before the UAW's
PRB reveals that insubstantial claims are not infrequently made within
the appeals system by members who insist on carrying such claims
through every internal appeal stage available. The time, effort, and
monetary expenditure required of the union to process such appeals to
completion is far from minimal. It is unfortunate that these cases arise
but, as in any system of jurisprudence, there is no way of recognizing
the unmeritorious from the meritorious claims until after they have
been resolved. This is one of the costs of maintaining a democratic
system of jurisprudence.
Finally, the outstanding contribution from a system of voluntary
impartial public review such as the UAW's is that which flows from its
mere existence. The UAW's PRB is constantly looking over the shoul-
der of every international and local union official in the sense that his
actions ultimately may come before that body for review. With few
exceptions, the conduct of such officials-from shop steward to inter-
national officer-reveals they are aware of this potential scrutiny.89
Many other organizations, labor and non-labor, throughout our Amer-
ican pluralistic society might do well to emulate the UAW's system of
resolving internal disputes.
89 Harrington, "What Union Members Think of Public Review," contained in a
Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Fund for the Republic)
entitled "Democracy and Public Review" 51, 52-53, 59-61, 64 (1960).
